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The paper discusses impressions and reflections of the author after six years of 
practical experiences as one of the first seven members of the Appellate Body 
(AB) of the WTO. These experiences are contrasted with analogous experiences 
encountered at the EU/EC level.
The first subjects relate to the composition, structure, organization and 
functioning of the Appellate Body and its divisions, such as the number of AB 
members, the length of their mandate, their personal status, the size of divisions, 
the selection of divisions, the exchange of views among all AB members, and 
the duration of the appeal procedure. Most of these issues are closely linked to 
the current negotiations on improvements and clarifications to the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU). The paper recommends maintaining the 
existing rules, with the one exception, namely lengthening of the mandate of AB 
members. The paper also shows the contribution which the organization of the 
AB has made to the astonishing degree of collegiality that characterises the AB. 
The early and clear definition of a method of interpretation, attributing major 
weight to the ordinary meaning of the words used in WTO Agreements, is 
considered in its different aspects, both for the internal functioning of the AB, 
for panels and for WTO Members. The recourse to customary rules of 
international law is welcomed, but might also present dangers if WTO Members 
see themselves confronted with developments that were not foreseen during the 
negotiations of the covered agreements.
Early appeals gave the Appellate Body the occasion to clarify important 
procedural issues such as the burden of proof, the standard of review and the 
distinction between issues of law and facts. The standard of review is of 
particular importance in safeguard, dumping, and subsidy cases, in which panels 
and the AB are asked to review the prior complex factual and legal findings of 
national authorities. Similarly sensitive is the determination of the meaning of 
municipal law.
Fact-finding is one of the weakest elements of the panel process, in spite 
of the broad rights of panels to ask for information, the corresponding obligation 
of WTO Members to provide such information, and the right of panels to draw 
negative inferences when information is not provided. The reasons are to be 
found, i. a., in the unresolved problems generated by the treatment of 
confidential information, which have not been satisfactorily answered in the 
covered agreements. The actual panel structure is not strong enough to deal with 
these problems. The panel structure should therefore be improved in the 




























































































Issues of substantive WTO law are compared with corresponding EC law, 
but only en passant: the difficulties encountered in comparing certain 
substantive WTO and EC rules that deal with similar problems, but which are 
structured differently; the absence of a hierarchy between overlapping WTO 
obligations; and the surprising fact that certain WTO prohibitions are stricter 
than corresponding EC prohibitions.
The WTO is characterised by an imbalance between the strong (quasi-) 
judicial structure set up by the DSU and the weak political decision making 
process which is all too often blocked, between major trade rounds, by the 
traditional consensus rule. The work of panels and the AB would be facilitated if 
the political filters of the WTO, i. e., the committees established by different 
covered agreements, functioned better, and if the Ministerial Conference or the 
General Counsel were able to adopt interpretations and amendments, pursuant to 
Articles IX and X of the Marrakesh Agreement. Instead of advocating 
mechanisms weakening the dispute settlement process, all efforts should be 
concentrated on strengthening the political arm of the WTO. But the role of 
panels and the AB should not be reinforced either: it would therefore be unwise 
to attribute direct effect to WTO rules in municipal (EC) law. In view of the 
weakness of the political decision making process, the responsibility of the AB 
is enormous. It must proceed with extraordinary circumspection and care. It is 
therefore advisable to pursue the cautious, case-specific approach that the AB 




























































































I. THE EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
1. The past six years as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO have been 
an extraordinary experience. Extraordinary from a professional legal point 
of view. But also extraordinary from a human perspective. I will always be 
grateful to all those who have permitted me to participate in and to share 
with them this truly exceptional period of development in the rule of law in 
the WTO.
2. I had never exercised a judicial function before my appointment as a 
Member of the Appellate Body. Becoming a judge is in all circumstances an 
interesting experience. Becoming a judge of a newly established (quasi-) 
judicial body which operates at world level and which is charged to review -  
without the possibility of further appeal — the legal findings of a lower 
(quasi) judicial body is simply fascinating. It is even more so when this 
newly established appeal “court” is at the very beginning of its work, i. e., if 
one participates as a judge in a judicial “green field" operation at the highest 
level for the world at large.
3. The settlement of international trade disputes was of course not a total 
novelty in 1995. It goes back to the early years of the GATT. The seventies, 
eighties and early nineties had seen a remarkable development and 
intensification of such disputes and a progressive judicialisation of dispute 
settlement procedures. However, in spite of some reforms, dispute 
settlement under the GATT 1947 remained governed by elements of 
diplomacy and consensus, which allowed the Contracting Parties to block 
the process, thus rendering it occasionally ineffective.
4. It is well known that the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round has eliminated these elements to a 
very large extent. Since the entry into force of the Marrakesh Agreement, 
dispute settlement has become a matter of compulsory jurisdiction for all 
Members of the WTO. It is this compulsory character which distinguishes it 
from all other existing international dispute settlement systems. I have 
always admired the imagination, courage and skills of those who led the 
negotiations on the new compulsory WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding to a successful end. In particular, I would like to pay tribute 
to the extraordinary qualities of the personality who chaired the group which 
was responsible for the negotiation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
during the Uruguay Round, my former colleague Ambassador Julio Lacarte. 
Negotiating the Dispute Settlement Understanding under the rule of 




























































































terms as a Member of the Appellate Body, I have always remained 
impressed by this achievement. It seemed to me then — and even today — to 
be wise not to take the existence of such a compulsory system for granted, 
and guaranteed forever, but to contribute through each Appellate Body 
report to its steady consolidation and further development.
5. The following remarks are not, and can not be, a systematic review of the 
Appellate Body’s activities during its first years. They express personal 
impressions and reflections that are strongly influenced by my earlier 
professional experiences, i. e., experiences of a lawyer who had to interpret 
and apply European Community law and who followed, as an outsider, the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. The following account is 
therefore rather “impressionistic”, in comparing frequently aspects of 
dispute settlement in the WTO with similar problems encountered in the EC 
context.
6. A final caveat is addressed to the many thoughtful observers of the work of 
the Appellate Body who have commented on its work. A more academic 
paper than this one should and would have referred to these comments. I 
have deliberately chosen not to do so. Selective references would have been 
unfair. Complete references would have delayed my story unreasonably. 
References are therefore limited to primary sources, i. e., essentially to 
WTO Agreements, implementing texts like the Appellate Body’s Working 
Procedures, and Appellate Body Reports.
II. THE COMPOSITION OF THE APPELLATE BODY
7. The institutional rules for the composition of the Appellate Body are well 
known. The Appellate Body is composed of 7 persons, who are to be 
appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for a four-year term, 
reappointment being possible once.' According to the DSU, “the Appellate 
Body shall comprise persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated 
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered 
agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government. The 
Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative of the 
membership in the WTO”2.
8. The first team of seven was composed of James Bacchus from the United 
States, Christopher Beeby from New Zealand, Florentino Feliciano from the 
Philippines, Julio Lacarte from Uruguay, Mitsuo Matsushita from Japan,
' Article 17(2) DSU.




























































































Said El-Naggar from Egypt and myself. Our professional backgrounds and 
experiences differed widely. Taken together, the group was a cocktail with 
ingredients from all branches of government, (the legislative, the executive 
and the judicial branches) international organisations (regional and world­
wide), academia, private law practice, and private arbitration. Some of us -  
like Julio Lacarte, who incarnates the history of GATT and the WTO -  were 
intimately familiar with the “covered agreements" and the past. Others, like 
myself, had hardly any earlier GATT experience. However, the wealth of 
widely different professional backgrounds, experiences and sensitivities 
proved immediately to be extremely useful and has been -  in my view -  one 
of the strengths of the Appellate Body since its very first activities.3
9. Our rapid — and successful — start was greatly facilitated by the — initially 
extremely small -  secretariat of the Appellate Body, headed until 2001 by its 
first director, Debra Steger.4 Debra Steger’s professionalism and dedication 
to the task of assisting the Appellate Body during its formative years greatly 
contributed to establishing the reputation and authority of the new appellate 
quasi-jurisdiction.
10. I will come back later to the workings of the Appellate Body and the 
secretariat, in particular to the question of collegiality. At this point, I would 
like to mention only one problem which results from the rules that govern 
the composition of the Appellate Body and which should be addressed 
during the current negotiations on improvements and clarifications to the 
DSU, launched after the successful ministerial meeting in Doha. The 
problem concerns the duration of the terms of office of members of the 
Appellate Body. A four-year term, which may be renewed once, does not 
seem to guarantee sufficiently the independence of the person appointed. 
This is not the place to rehearse all the arguments, which plead for a short 
term, which is renewable, and to weigh them against those, which plead for 
a longer term, which is not renewable. I am convinced that, on balance, the 
second option is the better one, if the personal independence of the term- 
holder is a matter of major concern. I would therefore plead for an extension 
of the actual four-year, once renewable term to a non-renewable term of 
eight years.
3 Today, only one of the original team of seven members continues to serve on the Appellate 
Body, i. e., James Bachus. Christopher Beeby (who disappeared prematurely), Mitsuo 
Matsushita and Said El-Naggar were replaced in 1999 by Georges Abi-Saab from Egypt, A. 
V. Ganesan from India and Yasuhei Taniguchi from Japan. At the end of 2001, Luiz Baptista 
from Brasil, John Lockhart from Australia and Giorgio Sacerdoti from Italy replaced Julio 
Lacarte, Florentino Feliciano and me.




























































































11. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I would like to stress that in pleading 
for a longer, non-renewable term of office of eight years, I do not want to 
give the impression that the existing regime has affected in any way the 
independence of the Appellate Body or any of its individual Members. On 
the contrary, I share fully the view expressed by my former colleague Julio 
Lacarte who said at the swearing-in ceremony for new Appellate Body 
members on 19 December 2001: “The Appellate Body has been described as 
unflinching in its rulings. I believe this to be the case. We are well aware 
that none of our rulings is likely to be greeted with universal approval; but 
our function is another: to be independent, impartial and objective at all 
times. I believe this also to have been the case.”
12. The DSU does not decide whether the members of the Appellate Body 
exercise a full-time or a part-time job. The language of the DSU points 
however in the direction of a part-time activity, as Article 17.3 requires that 
“all persons serving on the Appellate Body shall be available at all times and 
on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and 
other relevant activities of the WTO.” When the Appellate Body was 
established and during its first years, the choice of the part-time option was 
certainly wise. The number of appeals and the amount of work resulting 
from these appeals did not justify a status of full-time activity. However, the 
situation has changed over the last years. The number of appeals has 
increased considerably and has probably exceeded the expectations of the 
negotiators of the DSU. In addition, from the very beginning, the Appellate 
Body has adopted working methods which require a considerably longer 
presence of its members in Geneva than envisaged by those who conceived 
the first rules of employment of Appellate Body members, who were 
drawing on the experience with panels and panel members.
13. From the point of view of the WTO, there are good reasons to maintain the 
part-time regime as long as possible, in spite of the considerable and 
growing inconveniences for the members of the Appellate Body. However, 
at a certain point in time, the increase in appeals and the resulting workload 
will make it simply impossible to continue with the existing system. The 
actual part-time regime will have to be replaced by a system of full-time 
employment. It is obvious that the switch will have an impact on the 
availability of candidates for membership of the Appellate Body. I do not 
believe, however, that the impact will affect the quality of such candidates, 
if the authority and the prestige of the Appellate Body continue to grow, and 
if the conditions of employment are fair, as compared with other 




























































































14. Another response to the challenge of a growing workload has been the 
suggestion to increase the number of Appellate Body members from 7 to 9, 
or even more. I recognise that an increase in the number of Appellate Body 
members might be necessary or desirable in order to reflect the growing 
number of Members of the WTO. I do not share, however, the view that a 
greater number of Appellate Body members is the best reaction to the 
greater number of appeals and the resulting heavier workload. I admit that in 
1995, I was astonished to find myself in a small group of 7 persons, 
representing the overall membership of the WTO. But I have quickly learnt 
to appreciate the great wisdom of those who decided to limit the number of 
Appellate Body members to only 7. The small number has had, in my view, 
extremely positive effects on the intimacy and collegiality of the 
deliberations of the Appellate Body. What appeared, at first sight, almost as 
an anomaly, has proved to be a precious good. It should be maintained by all 
means as long as possible.
III. THE WORKING PROCEDURES
A. Procedure for Adoption
15. While the DSU contains several articles dealing with the establishment, 
terms of reference, composition, functions, procedures, rights and 
obligations of panels5, the same DSU devotes only one Article to the 
Appellate Body and appellate review.6 In addition, it provides that “working 
procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the 
Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the 
Members for their information.”7 The adoption of “working procedures” is 
thus a matter for the Appellate Body itself. The only procedural prerequisite 
is the consultation of the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, 
but not their approval or the approval by the DSB.
16. For somebody familiar with the EU, this procedure is simply stunning. The 
differences between the WTO and the EU systems are obvious. At the level 
of the respective treaties, the EC Treaty (including the attached Statute of 
the Court of Justice) is considerably more detailed than the DSU. At the 
level of “secondary legislation”, the EC Treaty entrusts the approval of the 
rules of procedure for the Court of Justice to the Council of Ministers, which
5 Articles 6 and following DSU.
6 Article 17 DSU.




























































































has to act unanimously still today8 9. In the WTO, by contrast, the adoption of 
working rules is left to the Appellate Body itself. At first sight, this choice is 
astounding. Its wisdom becomes, however, immediately apparent if one 
considers the alternatives. Is it realistic to assume that the Appellate Body 
would have been able to start its work with any working procedures, if their 
approval had been entrusted to the DSB, acting under the traditional rule of 
consensus? At what point in time would such consensus have been brought 
about? Is it totally unrealistic to assume that even today, the Appellate Body 
would have to operate without detailed working procedures if the approval 
of these working procedures had to been left to the DSB, acting according to 
the traditional consensus principle?
17. Developing and drafting the working procedures was the very first task of 
the Appellate Body when it met for the first time after the formal 
appointment of its members. After three weeks, this task was accomplished. 
The discussions and the resulting text laid the basis for a system of 
collegiate co-operation among all members of the Appellate Body, which is, 
in my view, one of its most remarkable achievements.
18. It is obvious that working procedures have to deal with technical details 
governing the organisation of the appeal procedure. But in the case of the 
Appellate Body, they also had to address a couple of rather sensitive issues, 
which one would have normally expected to have been the subject of 
provisions of the DSU agreed during the Uruguay Round. The following 
discussion will examine these issues in turn.
B. Divisions of Three Appellate Body Members and the Duration of the
Appeal Procedure
19. According to Article 17.1 DSU, appeals from panel cases are to be decided 
by only three of the seven members of the Appellate Body. These three 
persons are to be determined by a system of rotation. “Such rotation shall be 
determined in the working procedures.”1*
20. Six years ago, I considered the provision to decide appeals in divisions of 
only three Appellate Body members to be an anomaly. According to Article 
8.5 DSU, panels shall be composed of three panellists unless the parties to 
the dispute agree to a panel composed of five panellists. Panels can thus be 
larger than the Appellate Body division hearing the appeal. In normal
8 See Article 245 EC Treaty. Qualified majority will replace the unanimity requirement only
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice.




























































































judicial procedures, the situation is the reverse. The appeal court is larger 
than the court of first instance.
21. Today, the “anomaly” of divisions composed of only three Appellate Body 
members appears to me to be one of those wise decisions of the authors of 
the DSU, which should be maintained by all means. There seems to be a 
close connection between the decision to limit divisions to three Appellate 
Body members and the extremely short time limits prescribed for the appeal 
procedure.
22. According to Article 17.5 DSU, “as a general rule, the proceedings shall not 
exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its 
decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report. [...] 
In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.” In practice, the 90 period 
leaves little time for the Appellate Body itself, if one considers the time 
necessary for the parties (and third parties) to present their arguments in 
writing and at the oral hearing, i. e. before the Appellate Body can begin its 
deliberations, and if one deducts further the two weeks necessary for 
translation after the end of the process of drafting the Appellate Body report.
23. The 90 days deadline is of course highly unusual for an appeal procedure 
and presents obvious risks for the quality of the Appellate Body’s work. 
However, except in four cases (in which the parties agreed to a 
prolongation), the Appellate Body has been able to respect the deadline. In 
addition, the 90-day rule has contributed significantly to the efficiency of the 
appeal procedure. It has avoided the build-up of a backlog of cases. It should 
therefore be maintained as long as possible.
24. It is highly unlikely that the extremely short deadline of 90 days would and 
could have been respected if the divisions were composed of more than 
three Appellate Body members. The defence of the deadline of 90 days goes 
therefore hand in hand with the defence of the number of three for Appellate 
Body divisions hearing an appeal.
C. Exchange of Views
25. While decision-making by a division of three is easier than by a larger 
group, it also presents risks. A larger group might be wiser. A larger group 
might also assure greater coherence and continuity of decision-making over 
time than divisions of three with constantly varying membership.
26. The risk of diverging interpretations can be avoided by a procedure in which 




























































































not provide for such a procedure. It does not contain any reference to the 
Appellate Body deciding a case “e« banc “. It follows that all appeals have 
to be decided by divisions of three. However, the Working Procedures 
clearly express the Appellate Body’s concern for collegiality. Rule 4 reads 
in relevant part:
Collegiality
(1) To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, and to draw on the 
individual and collective expertise of the Members, the Members shall 
convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and procedure.
(2) [...]
(3) In accordance with the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the division 
responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other 
Members before the division finalises the appellate report for circulation to the 
WTO Members. [...]
(4) Nothing in these Rules shall be interpreted as interfering with a division’s full 
authority and freedom to hear and decide an appeal assigned to it in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the DSU.
27. The system of “exchange of views” among all members has proved to be of 
enormous benefit to the work of the Appellate Body. As intended, the 
exchanges have permitted divisions to draw on the individual and collective 
expertise of all members. In addition, they have contributed greatly to 
consistency and coherence of decision-making. The exchanges of views 
have thus contributed to “providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system” which is, according to Article 3 (2) of the DSU, 
the fundamental aim of the dispute settlement system of the WTO.
28. The system of exchange of views combines the benefits of deliberations of 
all seven Appellate Body members with the advantages of decision-making 
by divisions composed of only three members. If, in certain important cases, 
divisions of three were to be replaced by the full Appellate Body, hearing 
and deciding a case en banc, the advantages of decision-making by a small 
group of three would be lost. In addition, the introduction of decision­
making en banc would require a definition of those cases in which the full 
Appellate Body would have to hear and decide the case. This definition 
would probably contain discretionary elements that might lead, over time, to 
inflation in the number of cases attributed to the Appellate Body sitting en 
banc. All these considerations lead to the conclusion that the actual situation 
should not be changed. The introduction of a system of decision-making en 




























































































29. In addition to the system of exchange of views, other factors contribute to 
the collegiality among members of the Appellate Body. Some are very 
banal, and are related to the organisation of the Appellate Body’s secretariat. 
Like the WTO Secretariat in general, the secretariat of the Appellate Body is 
small and “lean”. Headed by a director, it is organised as a pool of lawyers 
and secretaries who serve all seven members of the Appellate Body, without 
being subdivided into individual members’ chambers. Contrary to other 
judicial bodies, members of the Appellate Body therefore do not enjoy the 
assistance of personal secretaries and assistants. From a strictly personal 
point of view, this might be an inconvenience. From the point of view of the 
Appellate Body as a whole, this organisation is its strength, as it facilitates 
communication among members.
D. Selection of Members Constituting a Division
30. As mentioned earlier, Article 17.1 DSU provides that Members of the 
Appellate Body shall serve in rotation, and that such rotation shall be 
determined in the working procedures. While Article 8.3 DSU addresses 
expressly the problem of nationality of panellists with respect to WTO 
Members which are parties to the dispute10, nothing is said in Article 17 
DSU for the appeal stage.
31. According to the Working Procedures “the Members of a division shall be 
selected on the basis of rotation, while taking into account the principles of 
random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to serve 
regardless of their national origin”.
32. From an institutional point of view, the third principle, i. e., opportunity for 
all Members to serve regardless of national origin, is certainly the most 
important one. The third principle is an expression of the even more 
fundamental principle of equality of all members of the Appellate Body. It 
guarantees that all members hear and decide an equal number of appeals. 
That would not be the case, if national origin were of any relevance for the 
composition of divisions. Statistically, the USA and the EU are the most 
active participants in panel and Appellate Body proceedings. The members 
of the Appellate Body who happen to be nationals of the USA or one of the 
EU Member States would therefore be either privileged or disadvantaged in
10 “Citizens of Members whose governments are patties to the dispute or third parties [...] 
shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree 
otherwise”. A footnote to Article 8 (3) DSU clarifies that “in the case where customs unions 
or common markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all member 




























































































the selection process if national origin were a positive or negative element 
for the composition of divisions hearing appeals in which one of these WTO 
Members is the appellant or appellee.
33. Apparently, the solution retained in the Working Procedures corresponded 
to the understanding which the vast majority of WTO Members had of the 
meaning of the DSU. It is nevertheless astonishing that the problem of 
nationality of Appellate Body members with respect to the parties in an 
appeal was not addressed expressly by the DSU, but left to be regulated by 
the Working Procedures.
34. The reason for the second principle, i. e., unpredictability, is less obvious. 
Unpredictability is intended to prevent appellants from trying to choose and 
pick among individual divisions, in speculating that a division composed of 
certain members might improve their chances of success. The first principle, 
i.e. the random selection, is simply a means to assure unpredictability.
35. In the light of experience, the system of rotation established six years ago 
has proved to be a success. The system has achieved a fair distribution of 
cases among Appellate Body members, without giving rise to criticism of 
national bias. Though not totally unpredictable for governments at all stages, 
the system has at least seriously limited what might be called “division 
shopping.” That the system has had the disadvantage of making the personal 
life of members of the Appellate Body unpredictable is regrettable, but a 
price that had to be paid.
E. Overall Evaluation
36. According to Article 17.11 DSU, opinions expressed in the Appellate Body 
report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body shall be anonymous. 
The DSU thus allows individual opinions, provided they are expressed 
anonymously.
37. The Working Procedures do not elaborate on Article 17.11 DSU. Instead, 
Rule 3.2 of the Working Procedures states:
The Appellate Body and its divisions shall make every .effort to take their decisions by 
consensus. Where, nevertheless, a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the 
matter at issue shall be decided by a majority vote.
38. Looking at the reports adopted by the Appellate Body during the first six 
years of its existence, it is apparent that the search for consensus required by 




























































































successful. None of the reports is accompanied by a dissenting opinion. In 
only one case has a member of the Appellate Body expressed an anonymous 
concurrent opinion.11 The absence of any dissenting opinion and the 
existence of only one concurrent opinion are of course no proof of total 
unanimity in all cases with respect to all arguments. But the quasi-total 
absence of individual opinions is nevertheless an indication of a remarkably 
high degree of consensus within the Appellate Body: otherwise, one would 
probably have seen more manifestations of individual positions.
39. The work of the Appellate Body is thus characterised by a very high degree 
of collegiality among its seven members, in spite of their different origins, 
professional and personal backgrounds and experiences. For an outsider, this 
collegiate cooperation might be astonishing. I am convinced -  as mentioned 
already — that the basis for this collegiality and friendly cooperation was 
laid in the Working Procedures. Their contribution to the achievements of 
the last years should therefore not be underestimated.
IV. METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
40. Article 3.2 DSU states that the dispute settlement procedure serves to clarify 
the existing provisions of the covered agreements “in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”
41. It was fortunate that early on the two first reports of the Appellate Body 
were used to flesh out the precise meaning of this general reference to 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. It is well 
known that in its Report in United States -  Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline (United States -  Gasoline), the Appellate Body 
stated that Article XX of the GATT 1994 had to be interpreted according to 
the general rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which “has attained the status of a rule 
of customary or general international law.”12 A similar statement was made 
in Japan -  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages with respect to Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention.13 Thus, the Appellate Body has clearly lain down, from 
the very beginning of its work, the rules of interpretation which it would 
(and which panels should) follow in interpreting the covered agreements.
11 Appellate Body, European Communities -  Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (European Communities -  Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April
2001, paras. 149 -  154.
12 Appellate Body, United States -  Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R,
adopted 20 May 1996, DSR, 1996:1, p. 3 (16)
13 Appellate Body, Japan -  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, adopted 1




























































































42. According to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, “a Treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.” Among these three criteria, the Appellate Body has certainly 
attached the greatest weight to the first, i. e., “the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the treaty”. This is easily illustrated by the frequent references in 
Appellate Body reports to dictionaries, in particular to the Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary, which, in the words of certain critical observers, has become 
“one of the covered agreements”. The second criterion, i. e. “context” has 
less weight than the first, but is certainly more often used and relied upon 
than the third, i. e., “object and purpose”.
43. For somebody having spent most of his professional life observing the 
European Court of Justice in interpreting European Community law, the 
difference in style and methodology could hardly be more radical. I do not 
remember that the EC Court of Justice has ever laid down openly and 
clearly the rules of interpretation that it intended to follow. What I do 
remember is that among the interpretative criteria effectively used by the EC 
Court of Justice, the predominant criterion was — and probably still is — 
“object and purpose”. While the Appellate Body clearly privileges “literal” 
interpretation, the EC Court of Justice is a protagonist of “teleological” 
interpretation.
44. Only in one respect, the approach of the Appellate Body and that of the 
European Court of Justice converge. Both attribute little importance to the 
“preparatory work of the Treaty” (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention). 
However, the motives are probably not the same. For the Appellate Body, 
the low value of the negotiating history results from the secondary rank 
attributed to this criterion by the Vienna Convention, the lack of reliable 
records, and the ambiguities resulting from the presence of contradictory 
statements of the negotiating parties. For the European Court of Justice, the 
reasons are probably a mixture of deliberate choice and technical difficulties 
in determining the intentions of the authors of the text to be interpreted.
45. The immediate and open definition of the basic rules governing 
interpretation, and the clear option in favour of a predominantly literal 
approach, have had important consequences both for the internal working of 
the Appellate Body and for the effects of its reports on the outside world.
46. Internally, the immediate reference to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, and the acceptance of the prime importance of “the ordinary 




























































































guidance to Appellate Body members working in different divisions and 
interpreting different provisions of different covered agreements. In other 
words: the very early consensus on interpretative principles has facilitated 
decision-making and contributed considerably to the consistency and 
coherence of Appellate Body reports. At the same time, this consensus has 
also contributed to the already mentioned high degree of collegiality and 
friendly cooperation among the seven Appellate Body members.
47. Even greater are the benefits of the open and transparent choice of the 
Appellate Body’s interpretative methods on the outside world. This choice 
has given clear guidance to Members of the WTO and to panels. It has thus 
contributed to “providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system” (Article 3.2, first sentence, DSU). The choice has been 
approved both by Members of the WTO and by critical observers, in 
particular by experts of international (trade) law. The recognition of Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention as customary international law has been 
accepted to be fully in conformity with the requirement that the existing 
provisions of the covered agreements be clarified “in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretations of public international law” (Article 3.2, 
second sentence, DSU). The heavy reliance on the “ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty” has protected the Appellate Body from 
criticism that its reports have added to or diminished the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements (Article 3.2, third sentence, 
DSU). On a more general level, the interpretative method, established and 
clearly announced by the Appellate Body, has had a legitimising effect, and 
this from the very beginning of its activity.
48. This general appreciation should not be misunderstood: It is obvious that not 
everybody agrees with the Appellate Body’s choices, or with the results 
reached. Criticism is voiced, in particular, when the Appellate Body seems 
to stretch or to deviate from its own interpretative methods. Nobody can, 
however, deny that the method of literal interpretation has limits, and that 
recourse to other interpretative criteria may be necessary, as is recognised by 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.
49. That the method of literal interpretation is relatively safe, and that its results 
are more easily accepted than results reached by other interpretative tools, 
can be easily illustrated by examples of cases in which the Appellate Body 
felt itself confronted with a “gap”, i. e., an issue which is apparently not 
addressed by the covered agreement, but which had to be decided 
nevertheless. In some cases, the results reached by the Appellate Body have 




























































































“completing the analysis”.14 15In at least one other case, the result has been 
severely criticised and is hotly debated. I am referring to the controversial 
issue of the admissibility of the unsolicited “amicus curiae” briefs in panel 
and Appellate Body proceedings. I will come back to this problem in 
another context later.13
50. The Appellate Body Report in United States -  Gasoline does not only lay 
the ground for systematic recourse to the rules of interpretation set out in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. This -  very first -  Report 
declares also that the direction given by Article 3.2 DSU (i. e., to interpret 
the covered agreements “in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law”) “reflects a measure of 
recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law.”16 The significance of this statement can 
hardly be overestimated. It is of course the starting point and general 
justification for frequent references to public international law rules and 
principles in many Appellate Body Reports adopted since United States -  
Gasoline. So far these references have more often served to give answers to 
procedural questions that have arisen in dispute settlement procedures than 
to problems concerning the substantive rights and obligations, which 
Members of the WTO have under the covered agreements. The true 
importance of the inter-relationship between the WTO Agreements and 
public international law will become apparent only when more of these 
latter problems of substance have to be addressed. Questions related to State 
responsibility might be the most topical, delicate and controversial among 
these problems of substance.
51. The recognition that WTO law is part of public international law has been 
widely applauded, in particular by members of the public international law 
community. For somebody who is not a traditional member of that 
community, the enormous interest which WTO law and WTO dispute 
settlement procedures have generated over the last years is striking and 
surprising. For somebody who is used to European Community law, this 
phenomenon is even more fascinating, as public international law plays 
hardly any role in the relations among the Member States of the EC.
14 See most recently Appellate Body, United States -  Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, para. 343, with references to earlier 
cases.
15 See below paragraphs 119 and following.




























































































52. The determination of the precise relevance of rules and principles of public 
international law for the covered agreements will obviously continue to 
require great care and circumspection. Critics of the new dispute settlement 
system argue that references to these rules and principles present 
considerable dangers, as they lack the certitude and precision of written 
provisions (though written provisions may themselves be vague and even 
contradictory). Critics point to Article 3.2, last sentence, DSU, according to 
which “recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” These 
warnings are certainly justified. However, the same Article 3.2 mandates 
that the dispute settlement system is “to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.” Even if this express reference to customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law were lacking, the interpreter of 
the covered agreements would hardly have any other choice but to have 
recourse to these rules of public international law.
V. THE EARLY CLARIFICATION OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Burden of proof
53. Contrary to other branches of government, the judicial branch can not chose 
what issues it wants to address first and what problems it prefers to resolve 
later. The judicial branch has to decide claims and respond to arguments that 
are made before it. It is not active, but reactive.
54. The Appellate Body was lucky that it had to give answers to a series of 
important procedural questions at a very early stage of its existence. One of 
these questions was the problem of burden of proof.
55. The issue of burden of proof is not addressed in the DSU. The problem had 
to be resolved by recourse to general principles. It is worth recalling what 
the Appellate Body said and how it reasoned. The decisive passage in 
United States -  Measure Affecting Imports o f Woven Wool Shirts and 
Blouses from India reads as follows:
In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial 
settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a 
claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international 
tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently 
accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or 
the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally 
accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, in most 




























































































defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party 
adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the 
burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence 
to rebut the presumption.17
56. Questions related to the burden of proof have been raised in a great number 
of cases, both before the panels and, on appeal, before the Appellate Body. 
Their prominence in WTO dispute settlement procedures contrasts with their 
quasi absence in proceedings before the European Court of Justice. I have 
often asked myself why this is so. Until now, I have not found a satisfactory 
answer. Only one element explaining the different weight of issues of 
burden of proof in the two types of procedures has occurred to me. It seems 
to be easier for an international quasi-judicial body like a panel to state that 
a party has not proved its claim than to declare that the claim is not founded. 
But is this explanation sufficient? I doubt it.
B. Standard of Review
57. Another important set of procedural issues which the Appellate Body had to 
address relatively early and which has become more and more important 
during the last years concerns the standard of review. The question of the 
appropriate standard of review arises in two respects. One is the relationship 
between the panel and the national authority, which has adopted the measure 
that is the object of the complaint; the other is the relationship between the 
Appellate Body and the panel.
58. Early on in the famous hormones case, the Appellate Body had the 
opportunity to find that the general standard of review which panels have to 
apply is laid down in Article 11 DSU.18 According to Article 11 DSU:
A panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability o f and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements...
59. The only exception to this rule is Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. But this exception is strictly limited to the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any notable difference 
between Article 11 DSU and Article 17.6 (i) of the Anti-Dumping
17 Appellate Body, United States -  Measure Affecting the Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses form India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, DSR 1997:1, p. 323 (335).
18 Appellate Body, European Communities -  Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:1, p.




























































































Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate Body in United States -  
Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan.19
60. In the hormones case, the Appellate Body found that:
The applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor “total deference”, but 
rather the “objective assessment of the facts”. Many panels have in the past refused to 
undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are 
in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, total 
deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, “could not 
ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU”.20
61. Since the hormones case, the Appellate Body has refined the standard of 
review for panels, in particular in a series of appeals concerning safeguard 
measures21. The actual situation has recently be summarised as follows:
Panels must examine whether the competent authority has evaluated all relevant 
factors; they must assess whether the competent authority has examined all pertinent 
facts and assessed whether an adequate explanation has been provided as to how those 
facts support the determination; and they must also consider whether the competent 
authority’s explanation addresses fully the nature and complexities of the data and 
responds to other plausible interpretations.22
62. While the preceding sections have shown considerable differences between 
dispute settlement in Geneva and in Luxembourg, the approach with respect 
to the applicable standard of review seems to show remarkable similarities, 
at least in so far as the European Court of Justice’s attitude vis-à-vis 
decisions taken, in analogous situations, by the European Commission is 
concerned. Both jurisdictions recognise that administrative bodies are better 
placed than they themselves to establish and evaluate complex economic 
facts. However, both refuse to limit themselves to control the respect of
19 Appellate Body, United States -  Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel 
Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, paras. 55 and 56.
20 Appellate Body, European Communities -  Hormones, op. cit. (footnote 18), para. 117 
referring to earlier panel reports.
21 See Appellate Body, Argentina -  Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina -  
Footwear), WT/DS1211/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 121; Appellate Body, United 
States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities (United States -  Wheat Gluten), WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001, 
para. 55; Appellate Body, United States -  Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or 
Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS 177/AB/R, WT/DS 178/AB/R, 
adopted 16 May 2001, paras. 103 and 106.
22 Appellate Body, United States -  Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yam 




























































































formal aspects of procedures. Both examine also whether the reasoning 
underlying a certain decision is reasonable and plausible.
63. As a matter of principle, this attitude can hardly be criticised. Difficulties 
and controversies will, however, arise as to how far the control of 
reasonableness and plausibleness will be pushed in practice and in 
individual cases. In this respect, panels and the Appellate Body have 
certainly to be more reserved and restrained than an internal jurisdiction like 
the European Court of Justice.
64. It is not astonishing, that WTO Members who have lost cases in Geneva 
have criticised the Appellate Body and argued that its reports interfere 
unduly with the discretion that the covered agreements leave to their internal 
investigating authorities. This criticism has been voiced in particular by the 
United States whose safeguard measures have been frequently submitted to 
dispute settlement procedures and who have been unsuccessful in defending 
them.23 During the last months, the question of standard of review has thus 
become one of the most controversial aspects of the Appellate Body’s 
jurisprudence. The EC complaint against the recent US safeguard measures 
against imports of steel will probably give it even more importance and 
prominence than it has acquired until now.
C. Distinction between Issues of Law and Issues of Facts
65. According to Article 17.6 DSU, an appeal shall be limited to issues of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. 
Issues of fact are therefore reserved to panels. They are not a matter for the 
Appellate Body.
66. In defining the standard of review for panels, the Appellate Body has also 
had the occasion, in the hormones case, to define for the first time the 
dividing line between issues of law and issues of fact. According to the 
Appellate Body:
The determination of whether or not a certain event did occur in time and space is 
typically a question of fact... Determination of the credibility and weight properly to 
be ascribed to (that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel 
of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion of a panel as the 
trier of facts. The consistency or inconsistency of a given fact or set of facts with the 
requirements of a given treaty provision is, however, a legal characterization issue. It
23 See in addition to the cases mentioned in footnotes 21 and 22 Appellate Body, United
States -  Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line




























































































is a legal question. Whether or not a panel has made an objective assessment of the 
facts before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, is also a legal question, which, if 
properly raised on appeal, would fall within the scope of appellate review.24
67. The Appellate Body Report in Hormones leaves no doubt that the legal 
qualification of a fact, i. e., the process of relating a fact to the requirements 
of a legal rule, is a legal issue. The control of this process is as much part of 
the responsibilities of the Appellate Body as the interpretation of the legal 
rule in abstracto.
68. The Appellate Body Report in Hormones clarifies also that the 
determination of the existence of a given fact as well as the determination of 
the weight of such a fact is, in principle, a matter for panels, and not for the 
Appellate Body. However, in proceeding with these determinations, a panel 
has to respect Article 11 DSU. According to the Appellate Body,
The deliberate disregard of or refusal to consider the evidence submitted to a panel is 
incompatible with a panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the facts. The 
wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly 
inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts. “Disregard” and “distortion” 
and “misrepresentation” of the evidence, in their ordinary signification in judicial and 
quasi-judicial processes, imply not simply an error of judgement in the appreciation of 
evidence but rather an egregious error that calls into question the good faith of the 
panel.25
69. Some critical observers have read this passage of the Hormones Report as an 
exhaustive interpretation of Article 11 DSU, and as a unjustified limitation 
to the right to argue on appeal that a panel has committed a legal error in 
determining the existence or the weight of certain facts. I have never 
considered this criticism to be warranted. I do not believe that the quoted 
passage limits the spectrum of possible violations of Article 11 DSU with 
respect to the determination of the existence of and weight to be attributed to 
a given fact or set of facts. Moreover, I am not certain that a legal error 
committed by a panel in this determination can only be raised with a claim 
that Article 11 DSU has been violated. For example, a panel commits, in my 
view, a legal error if, in the process of determining the existence of a fact, it 
violates the principles of logic. Whether this violation is made in good or 
bad faith is irrelevant. This legal error may be raised with a claim that the 
panel did not respect Article 11 DSU. In the absence of such a claim, no 
violation of Article 11 DSU can be found by the Appellate Body. However, 
the legal error may also affect the consistency of the panel’s finding relating
24 Appellate Body, European Coommnities -  Hormones, op. cit. (footnote 18), para. 132.




























































































to a substantive provision of the covered agreements, e. g. that the defendant 
WTO Member has, or has not, violated a provision of the GATT, the GATS, 
etc. Is it not enough to appeal this latter finding, without claiming 
simultaneously a violation of Article 11 DSU by the panel? Why is it 
necessary to argue a violation of Article 11, when in reality the appellant is 
concerned about the panel’s finding with respect to a substantive provision 
of the covered agreements? In other words: why multiply the arguments 
around Article 11 DSU?
D. Special Problem of the Determination of the Meaning of Municipal Law
70. Panels and the Appellate Body have been confronted several times with the 
question whether and to what extent they are entitled to determine the 
meaning of the law of a defendant WTO Member. The problem arises in 
particular when the dispute concerns the WTO-consistency of a statute or 
regulation as such, i. e., the WTO consistency of a statute or regulation, 
independently of any measure of implementation. That a complaint may be 
brought against a statute or regulation as such is firmly established in GATT 
and WTO jurisprudence. However, a statute or regulation will normally be 
found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement only if the statute or 
regulation is mandatory and not discretionary in nature.26
71. In India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products (India -  Patents) the Appellate Body made it clear that panels and, 
in case of an appeal, the Appellate Body itself have to determine the 
interpretation and meaning of municipal law 27. The ruling in India -  
Patents has recently been confirmed in United States -  Section 211. 
According to this latter report:
The municipal law of WTO Members may serve not only as evidence of facts, but also 
as evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations. Under 
the DSU, a panel may examine the municipal law of a WTO Member for the purpose 
of determining whether that Member has complied with its obligations under the WTO 
Agreement. Such an assessment is a legal characterisation by a panel. And, therefore, 
a panel’s assessment of municipal law as to its consistency with WTO obligations is 
subject to appellate review.28
26 Appellate Body, United States -  Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R and 
WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 20 September 2000, paras 51 and following.
27 Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:1, 9, paras. 65 and 
following.




























































































72. Like its rulings on the standard of review, the Appellate Body’s position 
with respect to the treatment of municipal law has recently been criticised, 
in particular by the United States. Experience suggests that the 
determination of the meaning of municipal law of WTO Members can be a 
delicate task. The contested legislation may be new and therefore not yet 
applied in practice.29 Or, the contested legislation may be old, but rarely 
used.30 Municipal courts may have interpreted it in different or even 
contradictory ways. The determination of the meaning of such law can 
therefore place panels and the Appellate Body before difficult choices. Like 
the issues surrounding the standard of review, the assessment of municipal 
law may well become one of the battlefields between individual Members 
and the quasi-judicial bodies of the WTO.
E. Fact Finding by Panels and the Corresponding Duties of WTO
Members
a) General Considerations
73. As we have seen, fact finding is a responsibility of the panels, not of the 
Appellate Body. It is widely held that fact finding is also the most difficult 
task of panels, and that it is one of the — if not the — weakest aspects of the 
panel process. Though not being in charge of this task, I have often asked 
myself, why this is so. Is it due to the lack or the weakness of the existing 
rules? Is it the result of the behaviour of Member States and the 
inappropriate response of panels? What should be done to improve the 
situation?
b) Right o f Panels to Seek Information
74. Article 13 DSU gives panels broad rights to seek information and technical 
advice from any source. According to the Appellate Body:
“It is clear from the language of Article 13 that the discretionary authoritiy of a panel 
may be exercised to request and obtain information, not just “from any individual or 
body” within the jurisdiction of a Member of the WTO, but also from any Member, 
including a fortiori a Member who is a party to a dispute before a panel. [...] It is equally 
important to stress that this discretionary authority to seek and obtain information is not 
made conditional [...] upon the other party to the dispute having previously established,
29 Like in the India -  Patents (see footnote 27) and in United States -  Section 211.




























































































on a prima facie basis, such other party’s claim or defence. Indeed, Article 13.1 imposes 
no conditions on the exercise of this discretionary authority.”31
c) Duty o f WTO Members to Provide Information
75. The broad rights to seek information conferred on panels by Article 13 DSU 
would be of little use if Members of the WTO had no legal duty to respond 
by providing the requested information. At first sight, Article 13 seems to 
limit Members’ responsibilities to a nobile officium, as it uses the word 
“should” instead of “shall”. The Appellate Body has however clarified that 
in the context and in view of the object and purpose of Article 13 DSU, 
“should” expresses a legal duty. The pertinent paragraphs of the Report in 
Canada — Measures Affecting the Export o f Civilian Aircraft (Canada -  
Aircraft) read as follows:
If Members that were requested by a panel to provide information had no legal duty to 
“respond” by providing such information, that panel’s undoubted legal "right" to seek 
information [...] would be rendered meaningless. A Member party to a dispute could, at 
will, thwart the panel’s fact-finding powers and take control itself of the information­
gathering process that Articles 12 and 13 DSU place in the hands of the panel. A 
Member could, in other words, prevent a panel from carrying out its task of finding the 
facts constituting the dispute before it and, inevitably, from going forward with the legal 
characterization of those facts ...
The chain of potential consequences does not stop there. To hold that a Member party to 
a dispute is not legally bound to comply with a panel’s request for information relating to 
that dispute, is, in effect, to declare that Member legally free to preclude a panel from 
carrying out its mandate and responsibility under the DSU. So to rule would be to reduce 
to an illusion and a vanity the fundamental right of Members to have disputes arising 
between them resolved through the system and proceeding for which they bargained in 
concluding the DSU.32
d) Right o f Panels to Draw Negative Inferences
76. A Member State might violate its duty under Article 13 DSU to provide the 
requested information. In this case, the panel may draw negative inferences
31 Appellate Body, Canada -  Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada -  
Aircraft), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 185.
32 Appellate Body, Canada -  Aircraft, op. cit. (footnote 31), paras. 188 and 189. The 
interpretation of the word “should” in Article 13 DSU is one of the rare cases in which the 
Appellate Body, in following the methodology prescribed by Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, clearly attributes more weight to the criteria of “context” and “object and 




























































































from this behaviour. Identified first in a subsidy case33, the right to draw 
negative inferences has also been recognised, without further discussion, in 
a case concerning safeguard measures.34 This latter case confirms that the 
drawing of (negative) inferences is an inherent and unavoidable aspect of 
any panel’s basic task of finding and characterising the facts making up a 
dispute.35
77. Until now, panels have not made use of their right to draw negative 
inferences in cases of refusal by WTO Members to provide the requested 
information. The hesitation of panels to use this right is understandable in 
disputes turning around information that is alleged to be confidential. 
Neither the DSU nor any other of the covered agreements seems to give a 
satisfactory answer to the question how to protect confidentiality, while at 
the same time guaranteeing equality of arms and due process.
e) Problems Related to Confidential Information
78. It is well known that confidential information raises a fundamental problem. 
On the one hand, access to and use of confidential information serve finding 
the truth. All regulators know that confidential information is indispensable 
for their task. On the other hand, confidential information is worthy of 
protection and should not be disclosed. However, the principles of equality 
of arms and due process require that the information available and used by 
one party has to be made accessible to the other party. According to these 
principles, some disclosure is unavoidable.
33 Appellate Body, Canada -  Aircraft, op. cit. (footnote 31), paras. 198-203. The recognition 
of the right to draw negative inferences is facilitated by the wording of the Subsidies 
Agreement. Annex V of this Agreement, entitled “Procedures for Developing Information 
Concerning Serious Prejudice”, provides in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:
6. Where information is unavailable due to non-cooperation by the subsidizing and/or 
third country Member, the panel may complete the record as necessary relying on best 
Information otherwise available.
7. In making its determination, the panel should draw adverse inferences from  
instances o f  non-cooperation by any party involved in the information-gathering 
process
34 Appellate Body, United States -  Wheat Gluten, op. cit (footnote 21). paras. 170-176.




























































































79. The protection of confidential information is one of the tenets of the covered 
agreements. As an example, it is useful to quote the Antidumping 
Agreement that is particularly detailed and precise. According to Article 6.5 
of this Agreement:
Any information which is by nature confidential [...] or which is provided on a 
confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall [...] be treated as such by the 
authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the 
party submitting it.
80. In order to respond to the due process requirement, Article 6.5.1 
Antidumping Agreement obliges interested parties to furnish non- 
confidential summaries. This provision recognises however that, in 
exceptional circumstances, it is not possible to provide such a summary.
81. Article 6 tries to satisfy the requirements of due process in requiring in 
paragraph 2 that:
Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full 
opportunity for the defence of their interests...
and in paragraph 9:
The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of 
the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to 
apply definitive measures.
82. However, in the end, the dilemma between finding the truth, protecting 
confidential information and guaranteeing due process remains unresolved. 
Article 12.2.2 Antidumping Agreement states solomonicly:
A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an 
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the 
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain [...] all relevant information on the 
matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures 
on the acceptance of a price untertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for 
the protection o f confidential information.
83. In Thailand -  Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections o f Iron 
or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, a panel has tried to deduce 
from Article 3.1 in conjunction with Article 17.6 that the Antidumping 
Agreement prohibits justifying an anti-dumping measure with evidence or 
reasoning that was not made available to interested parties in the final 




























































































panel’s finding. According to the Appellate Body, Article 3.1 permits the 
use of confidential information, while Article 17.6, defining the standard of 
review of panels with regard to national authorities, is not relevant for the 
treatment of confidential information.36
84. The provisions of Article 12.2, 3, 4 and 8 Subsidies Agreement are identical 
with or, at least, similar to the already mentioned provisions of the 
Antidumping Agreement. The Safeguard Agreement is less detailed, but 
also requires the protection of confidential information. It is therefore very 
likely that the conclusions of the Appellate Body in Thailand -  Steel will 
apply, mutatis mutandis, with respect to these two other agreements.
85. Confidential information is not only protected in proceedings before 
national authorities but also in proceedings before panels.37 The conflict 
between finding the truth, protecting confidential information and 
guaranteeing due process exists thus also at the level of the WTO. There is 
no provision that solves it in one way or the other. Individual panels have 
endeavoured to find an ad hoc solution, in proposing, or even adopting, 
procedural rules that try to “marry” the protection of confidentiality with the 
principle of equality of arms. At least in the relations between the United 
States and the EC, all these attempts have failed. The EC has systematically 
refused to accept these procedures, arguing that they limit access to the 
confidential information to a too narrow circle of officials. The transmission 
of confidential information to the panel alone is impossible. Such 
transmission would be incompatible with the prohibition of ex parte 
communications between the panel (or the Appellate Body).38
86. Considering the usefulness of its own Working Procedures, the Appellate 
Body has suggested, on several occasions, that standard rules of procedure 
should be adopted for panels.39 As of now, such standard rules of procedure 
do not exist.40 Their establishment and adoption would, indeed, be highly 
desirable. They would structure and regulate the panel process with more 
precision and in greater detail. They would better organise the fact finding
36 Appellate Body, Thailand -  Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron 
or Non-Iron Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland (Thailand -  H-Beams), WT/DS122/AB/R, 
adopted 5 April 2001, paras. 117 and 118
37 Article 13.1, last sentence, DSU.
38 Article 18.1 DSU.
39 See Appellate Body, Argentina -  Footwear, op. cit. (footnote 21) footnote 68 with 
references to earlier Appellate Body Reports.
40 According to Article 12.1 DSU, “Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 
3 [DSU] unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute.” 




























































































process, guaranteeing the full respect of the principle of due process. They 
would make sure that procedural objections are advanced by the parties, and 
addressed by the panel, as early as possible in the proceedings, instead of 
being raised and ruled upon late in the dispute settlement process. It is, 
however, doubtful whether the conflicts related to the treatment of 
confidential information can at this point be addressed satisfactorily outside 
the current negotiations on improvements and clarifications to the DSU. It is 
noteworthy that the Appellate Body has characterised the problem of 
confidential information as a “serious systemic issue”.41 It is in my view one 
of the most urgent, but also one of the most difficult problems to be solved.
VI. THE PANEL STRUCTURE
87. The preceding discussion shows that the weakness of the fact finding 
process at the level of panels is -  at least in part -  a consequence of the lack 
of rules for one fundamental aspect of this process, that is the treatment of 
confidential information. In addition, it may be the result of the behaviour of 
Member States and the unsatisfactory response of panels to this behaviour. 
Is there something else that could and should be done to improve the 
situation?
88. The question leads us to an even more delicate issue, i. e., the structure of 
the panel system.
89. The Appellate Body is a permanent institution.42 Its seven members are, as 
discussed earlier, appointed for a four-year term, which can be renewed 
once.
90. On the contrary, for every dispute, a panel is established ad hoc.43 4Also the 
panel members are designated ad hoc. The criteria that define the categories 
of eligible persons are broad and leave a wide margin of discretion. The 
WTO maintains a list of governmental and non-govemmental individuals 
possessing the necessary qualifications, from which panelists may be drawn, 
but the list is “indicative”.
91. Panel members are independent. According to Article 8.2 DSU, panel 
members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the
41 Appellate Body, United States -  Wheat Gluten, op. cit. (footnote 19), para. 170.
42 Article 17 DSU is entitled “Appellate Review”, but has the sub-title “Standing Appellate 
Body”.
43 Article 6 DSU.




























































































members. For the same reason, Article 8.3 DSU provides that citizens of 
Members whose governments are parties to the dispute or third parties shall 
not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the 
dispute agree otherwise.
92. Panel members are in general highly qualified personalities. Some become 
panelists only once. Others serve as panelists on several occasions.
93. There can be no doubt that panelists are independent. However, the DSU 
contains absolutely no rules that guarantee structurally this independence.
94. Being selected as a panelist is an honour and a personal distinction. It is not 
astonishing that a panel member is interested in being re-appointed and in 
serving again as a panelist.
95. In view of the difficulties facing panels in the fact finding process, and in 
the light of the institutional instability of panels and their members, I do not 
believe that one can expect ad hoc appointed panel members to proceed with 
the same determination as members of a permanent (quasi-) judicial body, 
like the Appellate Body. This assumption applies in particular with respect 
to the delicate process of drawing negative inferences.
96. It is in my view therefore highly desirable to modify the actual panel system 
and to guarantee structurally the stability of panels and, thus, the 
independence of their members. Two avenues should be actively explored. 
One is the establishment of a standing panel with members appointed for a 
certain number of years, following the example of the Appellate Body. In 
order to allow for a certain specialisation, the standing panel could be 
composed of different sections (divisions) with expert panelists. Another, 
less ambitious reform would be to establish a limited list of potential panel 
members, which should however not be too large. Panelists would have to 
be chosen from that limited list. Like the solution of the problem of 
confidential information, the reform of the existing panel system should be 
undertaken in the context of the current negotiations on improvements and 
clarifications to the DSU.
VII. ISSUES OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. General Considerations
97. As I have explained earlier, when I arrived in Geneva in 1995,1 did not have 
an in-depth knowledge of GATT law. Discovering and exploring the world 




























































































as much a new and fascinating experience as applying for the first time the 
rules of a (quasi-) judicial appeal procedure.
98. In the context of this retrospective, I will limit myself to a very few systemic 
remarks of a general nature. I will therefore avoid any discussion of specific 
provisions and issues. Such a discussion would clearly go beyond the object 
and purpose of this paper.
99. I do not doubt that my earlier experience with EC law has assisted me in the 
understanding a number of issues of substantive WTO law. Particularly 
helpful was the familiarity with the fundamental freedoms, and more 
specifically the free movement of goods. Useful also was my latest Brussels 
experience at the Directorate General of Competition. To illustrate this 
point, it is sufficient to mention words like “directly competitive or 
substitutable”45, which remind the competition lawyer of defining the 
relevant product market, in order to assess the market power of 
undertakings, etc.
B. Difficulties Arising from Structural Differences between WTO and EC
Law
100. The prior experience with EC law is however not always of assistance. It 
can also contribute to difficulties of understanding and be a source of 
confusion, when EC law is structured differently — at least at first sight — 
from WTO law. Two practical examples come immediately to my mind.
101. The first example is the different structure of the fundamental prohibition 
guaranteeing the free movement of goods in the EC Treaty, i. e,. Article 28, 
on the one side, and Articles III.4 and Article XI.1 GATT (1994), on the 
other. While I have never felt any difficulty in understanding the 
prohibition of fiscal discriminations in Article III.2 GATT (1994), which 
resembles very much Article 90 EC Treaty, I have always been profoundly 
intrigued by the requirement of “likeness” in Article III.4, and by the 
dividing line between this Article and Article XI. 1. The Report in 
European Communities -  Asbestos has obliged the Appellate Body to 
contribute to the interpretation of the first element, i.e., the requirement of 
“likeness”.46 Regrettably, until now, no appeal has given the opportunity to 
do the same with respect to the second element, i. e., the dividing line 
between Article III.4 and Article XI. 1.
45 See Note Ad Article III Paragraph 2 GATT (1994).





























































































102. The second example of a different structure is the notion of services jn the'' ^  
GATS and in the EC Treaty. While the notion of services in the GATS is 
broad, and the scope of the GATS is therefore large, the notion of services, 
and the corresponding fundamental freedom, in the EC Treaty is narrow, as 
the freedom to provide services is defined, in the EC Treaty, as a residual 
freedom.47 Experts of EC law should therefore approach the GATS with 
particular caution and circumspection in order to avoid misunderstandings 
and wrong interpretations.
C. Cumulating of Substantive Obligations in WTO Law
103. While working as a lawyer in Brussels, I have always been concerned with 
questions of architecture between different legal rules. EC law gives rise to 
this type of question with respect to both competencies and procedures, as 
well as to substantive obligations. The questions concerning competencies 
and procedures are due to the multitude of and differences between legal 
bases for secondary legislation at the EU/EC level: What institution(s) is 
(are) entitled to act? According to what procedure(s)? In particular with 
respect to the Council, is unanimity required or is qualified majority 
sufficient? The questions concerning substance relate mainly to the rights 
and obligations of Member States: Is their activity forbidden by primary or 
secondary Community law? What is the relationship between total and 
partial prohibitions? Do they apply cumulatively? Or is one of them a lex 
specialis with respect to the other?
104. During my time in Geneva, I have not encountered the first type of 
questions, but, of course, I have come up against the second. From the 
beginning, I have been impressed by what seems to me to be a rather 
important difference between the two legal orders. Substantive WTO law 
appears to me to be less structured than EC law. The same contested 
measure is often examined under a series of provisions, possibly contained 
in different covered agreements. All these provisions and agreements seem 
to apply simultaneously and cumulatively. There seems to be no -  or at 
least little -  structure, and overall architecture, which would allow 
distinguishing between lex generalis and lex specialis. This general 
proposition can be illustrated by a few practical examples.
47 See Article 49 EC Treaty, according to which “services hall be considered to be ‘services’ 
within the meaning of this Treaty ... insofar as they are not governed by the provisions 




























































































105. The first example concerns the relationship between the GATT and the
GATS. Neither of these agreements regulates its relationship with the 
other. Are all measures concerning goods, and falling therefore under the
GATT, also potentially cases concerning services, and falling therefore also 
under the GATS, because goods have to be sold, and selling is a service 
falling under the GATS? Will it not be necessary to develop a dividing line 
between the two Agreements, in order to avoid a systematic and automatic 
overlap, which was hardly intended by the authors of the two texts?48
106. The second example concerns the relationship between the GATT, the 
GATS and the Subsidies Agreement. Measures regulating the granting of 
subsidies in general or determining whether a subsidy is granted in an 
individual case fall under the general prohibitions of the GATT and the 
GATS. At the same time, they are subject to the Subsidies Agreement. 
Again, one may ask whether it would not be necessary (or appropriate) to 
determine a dividing line between these three agreements, in order to avoid 
a systematic overlap of the three texts.
107. A third example may be offered by the GATT and the TBT Agreement. 
Until now, the Appellate Body has examined the TBT Agreement only 
once, but only with respect to the question whether the measure at stake 
was susceptible or not of falling under this Agreement.49 The relationship 
between the GATT and the TBT Agreement remains to be examined.50
108.1 am not sufficiently familiar with the history of WTO law to offer a 
considered explanation of why WTO law seems to be less structured than 
the corresponding EC law. The reasons may be found in the way in which
48 The relationship between the GATT and the GATS was at issue in Canada -  Certain 
Measures Concerning Periodicals, (WT/DS31/AB/R), adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:1,449 
(463-465); European Communities -  Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, (WT/DS/27/AB/R), adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:11, 591 (678-680); and 
Canada -  Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (WT/DS139/AB/R and 
WT/DS1422/AB/R), adopted 19 June 2000 paras. 147 and following.
49 Appellate Body, European Communities -  Asbestos, op. cit. (footnote 11), paras. 59 and 
following.
so The TBT Agreement specifies in Article 1.5 that its provisions do not apply to sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures as defined in Annex A of the SPS Agreement. Article 2.4 of the SPS 
Agreement states that sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant 
provisions of the SPS Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations 
of the Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX (b). These provisions prove 
that questions of structure between substantive rights and obligations contained in different 
agreements were present in the mind of at least some of the negotiators. But such provisions 




























































































the WTO Agreements were negotiated and in which they are to be 
interpreted, according to the Vienna Convention. Perhaps it is also 
premature to compare the two legal orders, taking into account their 
different state of development, at least with respect to interpretation and 
clarification by their respective judicial or quasi-judicial organs. In any 
case, the evolution of the question of structure and architecture seems to me 
to be a particularly interesting aspect to observe in the future.
D. More Stringent WTO Law than EC Law Obligations
109. A final point worth mentioning is the fact that in certain respects, WTO law 
has been interpreted more strictly than EC law. The most obvious example 
is Article III.2, first sentence, GATT (1994). According to this provision, 
“the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess 
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.” The 
sentence is interpreted literally: Imported products which are “like” some 
domestic products can not be taxed higher than these domestic products, 
even if they are taxed in the same way as identical other “like” domestic 
products. A “real world” example, which was considered by a GATT panel 
and by the European Court of Justice, concerned beer. Beer brewed by 
small breweries was taxed less than other beer. The taxation privilege was 
not limited to domestic beer. A GATT panel considered the tax privilege to 
be per se contrary to Article III.2, first sentence, as beer produced by 
breweries of whatever size is a like product51 52. The European Court of 
Justice considered a similar tax privilege to be compatible with the 
corresponding provision of the EC Treaty.5
110.1 do not want to suggest that the GATT panel was wrong, while the 
European Court of Justice was right. The case before the panel may very 
well have been a case of (de facto) discrimination that ought to have been 
found inconsistent with Article III.2, first sentence. The point that I want to 
make is more limited, but at the same time broader. It is more limited, as I 
simply want to show that there are situations in which WTO law has been 
interpreted more restrictively than the corresponding EC law provisions. 
The broader point is, I wonder whether it is plausible that WTO law is 
stricter than EC law. Normally, one would expect the rules governing the
51 United States -  Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/R, adopted 19
June 1992, 39S/206, para. 5.19.





























































































relations among members of the wider grouping (the WTO) to be more 
flexible than those that apply within the much smaller club (the EU/EC) 
which, in addition, pursues more ambitious goals, like the establishment of 
the internal market without internal frontiers. I recognise that there might 
be good reasons to have a stricter discipline world wide than the EU/EC 
internally when it comes to a particular sector, like agriculture. It is also 
possible that the WTO might want to maintain greater discipline than the 
EU/EC with respect to subsidies, taking into account the fact that the 
EU/EC is a club of relatively rich countries that have a certain inclination 
to solve economic and societal problems through subsidies. I would submit 
however, that, as a general rule, one would expect the law governing the 
relations of WTO members to be more flexible and less strict than the rules 
applying within the EU/EC. There must be particular reasons to arrive at 
the opposite results. If there are not such reasons, I would be inclined to 
doubt that the result is right, and that it is sustainable in the long term.
VIII. THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE STRONG (QUASI ) JUDICIAL 
AND THE WEAK POLITICAL STRUCTURES
A. General Considerations
111. Since my arrival in Geneva, I have been impressed by the imbalance 
between the strong (quasi-) judicial structure set up by the DSU and the 
inefficiency of the political decision making process. While the Uruguay 
Round has substituted the traditional diplomatic and consensual panel 
system by the compulsory and quasi- automatic dispute settlement system 
of the DSU, the same Uruguay Round has left intact, in practice, decision 
making by consensus for all matters other than dispute settlement.53 
Political decision making by consensus is even more difficult today than 
before 1995, as membership of the WTO has increased and is continuing to 
grow.
112. Judges have to decide those cases that are brought before them. They are 
not allowed to refuse to solve the issues that the parties to the dispute put to 
them because these issues are legally or politically delicate. This task is 
often difficult, even if the political decision making process is well adapted 
and functions smoothly. The judge’s job becomes much more delicate, if 
the political decision making process is slow or — as in the case of the 
WTO — practically blocked.
53 See Article IX. 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
according to which “the WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus 




























































































113. Observers of the history of the EC know that the imbalance between the 
political institutions (in concreto the Council, being unable to decide 
because of the unanimity principle) and the judiciary (the European Court 
of Justice) is dangerous. The judges in Luxembourg see themselves 
confronted with cases that would not have arisen if the political decision 
making process had worked satisfactorily. Recourse to the Court of Justice 
might be used, in particular by the European Commission, but also by the 
European Parliament, to put pressure on the Council, or on individual 
Member States, to bring about political decisions.
114. The institutional architecture of the WTO is different from the EU/EC. 
Panels and the Appellate Body can not be used by the WTO Secretariat or 
individual WTO Members to invigorate the political decision making 
process.
115. Panels and the Appellate Body may nevertheless be called upon to decide 
claims that raise questions that are politically delicate. Neither a panel nor 
the Appellate Body is entitled to refuse to rule on such claims, made by the 
complainant or the appellant, because the panel or the Appellate Body 
wants to avoid deciding a question of legal interpretation that has delicate 
political consequences. Such a refusal would be contrary to Article 3.2, 
second sentence, DSU. According to this provision the “Members 
recognize that the dispute settlement system serves to preserve the rights 
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify 
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary 
rules of public international law”. In addition, the Appellate Body has to 
respect Article 17.12 DSU, which states that the “Appellate Body shall 
address each of the issues raised... during the appellate proceedings.”
116. Critics of the actual dispute settlement procedures, and of panels and the 
Appellate Body rulings, may object that in deciding difficult questions of 
legal interpretation, that have delicate political consequences, panels and 
Appellate Body reports may lead to recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB that add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements, contrary to Article 3.2, last sentence, DSU. I do not 
deny that this risk exists. However, the refusal to decide on a claim, or on 
an issue raised in an appeal, would be, by itself, an egregious violation of 




























































































B. Unsatisfactory Functioning of Political Filters
117. Panels and the Appellate Body may be faced with complaints that would 
not be raised, or which would disappear, if the political filters provided by 
WTO Agreements would function. The committees instituted by different 
covered agreements could act as such filters. To take two practical 
examples: the case concerning India -  Quantitative Restrictions on Imports 
o f Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products54 would probably not have 
arisen, if the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions had taken a 
decision on the still existing Indian import restrictions. Similarly, in Turkey 
-  Restriction on Imports o f Textile and Clothing Products, the Appellate 
Body might not have felt obliged to comment on its responsibilities with 
respect to the interpretation of Article XXIV GATT (1994), if the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements had come to a conclusion on the 
compatibility of the customs union between the EC and Turkey55.
118. Both cases are quoted by critics as examples of where the Appellate Body 
has overstepped the limits of its powers and assumed responsibilities that 
belong to the political organs of the WTO. I consider this criticism to be 
unfounded. I share the view that the political organs of the WTO might be 
better suited than a panel and the Appellate Body to determine whether a 
Member is facing a balance-of-payment crisis, or whether a regional trade 
agreement is compatible with Article XXIV GATT (1994). But I am also 
convinced that a panel and the Appellate Body can not refuse to determine 
whether a measure is or is not consistent with a covered agreement, 
because a WTO committee has been unable to reach a consensus and has 
thus abstained to come to a conclusion. The imbalance between the strong 
judicial and the weak political decision making process should not be 
redressed in weakening the judicial, but in strengthening the political arm 
of the WTO.
C. Blockage of the Process of Interpretations and Amendments
119. The dilemma created by the actual imbalance between the two branches of 
the arms of the WTO is illustrated even more dramatically by the 
differences between the Appellate Body and the majority of WTO 
Members concerning the status of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs. It is 
well known that, according to the Appellate Body, both panels and the 
Appellate Body have the authority to accept and consider unsolicited
54 Appellate Body, WT/DS/90/AB/R, adopted 22 September 1999, paras. 80 and following.




























































































amicus curiae briefs, if they find it pertinent and useful to do so.56 On the 
contrary, the vast majority of WTO Members take the view that neither 
panels nor the Appellate Body have this authority. They consider that the 
Appellate Body has wrongly interpreted the DSU, that it has violated its 
mandate, and that it has thereby added to or diminished the rights and 
obligations of WTO Members
120.1 do not contest that the silence of the DSU with respect the amicus curiae 
problem can be interpreted in different ways and that the interpretation of 
this agreement with respect to unsolicited amicus curiae briefs is therefore 
a difficult question. As a consequence, I can also understand the protests 
that the interpretation of the Appellate Body has generated. I do not 
believe, however, that it is appropriate to voice these protests at meetings 
of the Dispute Settlement Body and leave the matter there, expecting that 
the Appellate Body will change its position in the light of criticism of 
individual WTO members, even if these Members form a large majority. If 
Members feel that the Appellate Body has made a mistake and that it 
should modify its interpretation, they should use the legal forms provided 
for by the Marrakesh Agreement. According to Article IX.2 of this 
Agreement, “the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall 
have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations [...] of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements. [...] The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be 
taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members.” According to Article 
X.8 of the Marrakesh Agreement, the DSU can be amended, on a proposal 
from any Member, “by consensus” and “shall take effect for all Members 
upon approval by the Ministerial Conference”. WTO experts may argue 
whether amendment or interpretation is the more appropriate way to
56 Appellate Body, United States -  Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(United States- Shrimps), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 99-110; 
Appellate Body, United-States -  Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products originated in the United Kingdom, (United States - 
Lead and Bismuth II) WT/DS1388/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras.36-42 and following; 
and Appellate Body, European Communities -  Asbestos, op. cit. (footnote 11), paras. 50-57. 
The decisive paragraph in United-States -  Lead and Bismuth II, para. 39, reads as follows:
In considering this matter, we first note that nothing in the DSU or in the Working Procedures 
specifically provides that the Appellate Body may accept and consider submissions or briefs 
from sources other than the participants and third participants in an appeal. On the other hand, 
neither the DSU nor the Working Procedures explicitly prohibit acceptance or consideration 
of such briefs. However, Article 17.9 of the DSU provides: [...] This provision makes clear 
that the Appellate Body has broad authority to adopt procedural rules which do not conflict 
with any rules and procedures in the DSU or the covered agreements. Therefore, we are of the 
opinion that as long as we act consistently with the provisions of the DSU and the covered 
agreements, we have the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider any 




























































































proceed, taking into account the decision making traditions in Geneva. 
However, at least among lawyers, there should be no doubt that one of 
these legal channels has to be used by WTO Members if they want to guide 
the Appellate Body in its future attitude towards the amicus curiae issue or 
any other contested problem of interpretation.
121. The tradition of decision making by consensus is obviously an enormous 
obstacle on the road to successful use of the formal legal channels to 
interpret or to amend the covered agreements. Because of my limited 
experience as a member of the Appellate Body -  as opposed to the political 
decision making machinery of the WTO -  I do not feel qualified to make 
any suggestions to facilitate or modify the habitual voting practices. I am 
however convinced that all efforts should be deployed in the direction of 
strengthening the political decision making capacity of the WTO. I am 
afraid that the results achieved during the Uruguay Round with respect to 
dispute settlement can only be sustained, in the long run, if political 
decision making becomes easier and a true complement to judicial decision 
making.
D. Urgency of Improving Political Decision Making
122.1 thus share the view that the actual imbalance between the judicial and the 
political arms of the WTO is dangerous. But I belong to the group of those 
who feel that the remedy should be found in improving the political 
decision making capacity. On the contrary, I am firmly opposed to all 
proposals to turn the wheel of history back and to re- establish mechanisms 
which either make recourse to panels and the Appellate Body more difficult 
or which facilitate blocking its results. I therefore strongly disagree with 
recent suggestions to move the WTO dispute settlement system partially 
back in the direction of the original ‘diplomatic’ model for dispute 
settlement, and away from the judicial model introduced by the DSU. One 
of these suggestions is that the Director General or a special standing 
committee of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) be empowered to step in 
and direct the contending WTO Members to settle their differences through 
bilateral negotiations, mediation, or arbitration by an outside party. Another 
recommendation is to set up a new blocking mechanism according to which 
at least one-third of the members of the DSB, representing at least one- 
quarter of the total trade among WTO Members, could oppose a panel or 
Appellate Body report, so that the report would be set aside. These 
proposals are not only flawed from a technical point of view, but they go 
also in the wrong direction. Instead of targeting the weaknesses of the 
traditional political decision-making process, they attack the strengths of 




























































































123. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I would like to underline that I am 
not opposed to any interpretation or amendment, decided according to 
Articles IX or X of the Marrakesh Agreement, tending to provide an 
interpretation of a provision that is different from that adopted by the 
Appellate Body, effectively directing how the provision should be 
interpreted by panels and the Appellate Body in the future. On the contrary, 
I would be reassured if the political arm of the WTO had the ability to so 
decide. Today, my position is thus fundamentally different from what it 
was some 10 years ago, when the European Council undertook to “correct” 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on certain consequences 
of the principle of equal pay for male and female workers through the 
adoption of the famous “Barber Protocol”. In those days, I felt that the 
action of the European Council would undermine the authority of the Court 
of Justice, and that the adoption of the “Barber Protocol” was therefore a 
mistake. Today, I consider it to be perfectly legitimate that the legislative 
branch clarifies a provision of a covered agreement, provided this is done 
in those forms that the respective “constitutive” charter prescribes. I would 
even go one step further and congratulate the WTO if its political organs 
were able to use Articles IX and X of the Marrakesh Agreement to react to 
an interpretation of a covered agreement, given by a panel or the Appellate 
Body, with which these political organs disagree. The inability of the 
political organs of the WTO to do so reveals not only a serious institutional 
weakness, but also a flaw with respect to the fundamental principle of 
democracy which requires that judges are subject to the law, and that the 
law can be changed by the legislator.
E. Dangers of Attributing Direct Effect of WTO Law
124. The actual imbalance between the strong (quasi-) judicial and the weak 
political structures of the WTO lead to two further observations. Both 
concern the (quasi-) judicial branch of the WTO.
125. As the (quasi-) judicial arm has proven already to be much stronger than 
the political arm of the WTO, nothing should be done which would 
strengthen further the role of the judiciary with respect to the role of the 
other two branches of government. This would however happen if WTO 
Members were to give WTO law “direct effect”, i. e., give private parties 
the right to invoke WTO law before national courts. It is obvious that 
recognising direct effect of international agreements results in a shift of 
power between constitutional institutions: the position of the government 
and the parliament is weakened, and that of the courts strengthened. 




























































































effect because they want to discipline the omnipotence and arbitrariness of 
government and parliament. Were the shift in weight confined to the 
domestic level, I could leave it at this conclusion. But the weights will shift 
at the level of the international organisation as well.
126. Why? A Member whose courts grant direct effect is likely to become an 
aggressive partner in the context of WTO dispute settlement, if it wishes to 
uphold the balance of rights and duties between itself and its treaty 
partners. The shift in the balance results from the private actions against 
violations of WTO law to which the Member recognising direct effect will 
be exposed domestically, while there are no comparable court actions in the 
partner countries. A Member keen to maintain the balance of rights and 
obligations will be compelled by economic and political considerations to 
defend the interests of its exporters and investors before the panels and the 
Appellate Body. It will enforce rights in WTO dispute settlement 
procedures that it would either not have defended at all in “judicial” form, 
or, at least, not at the time chosen, if WTO law had no direct effect in its 
home territory.
127. The greater number of the probably increasingly complex complaints will 
lead to a further strengthening of panels and the Appellate Body in 
comparison with the political bodies of the WTO. For the reasons exposed 
earlier, I do not believe that it is wise to do so. I am therefore opposed to 
granting direct effect to WTO law. Recognition of direct effect would 
harm, instead of help, the WTO!
F. Responsibility of the Appellate Body: Principled or Case Specific
Reasoning?
128. My second observation concerns the responsibility of the Appellate Body. 
As a quasi - court of appeal and of last resort, its responsibility would be in 
any case enormous. However, its responsibility is even greater than that of 
a normal court of last instance. The additional responsibility results from 
the just discussed weakness of the political arm of the WTO. Because of 
the traditional decision making pattern, the Appellate Body can hardly 
expect direction by a Ministerial Conference or the General Council, 
acting, between major trade rounds, according to Articles IX or X of the 
Marrakesh Agreement.
129. The Appellate Body has therefore to proceed with extraordinary 
circumspection and care. This general guideline does not apply only to the 
final results that the Appellate Body will reach, but also to every step that it 




























































































the reasons set out in Appellate Body reports avoid sweeping statements, 
and are closely linked to the particular facts and circumstances of the case 
to be decided. From the point of view of the “security and predictability of 
the multilateral trading system”57, this cautious attitude might be regretted. 
It could well be argued that security and predictability would be better 
served by broad statements of principle that allow WTO Members to orient 
their activities in the future. The relatively narrow findings of the Appellate 
Body might even be criticised as not fully compatible with the overall 
mandate of the dispute settlement system to “clarify the existing 
provisions” of the covered agreements58
130. A more principled, less case specific approach would certainly carry the 
risk that the Appellate Body would have to correct its reasoning in future 
appeals. I recognise that, to a certain degree, this process of refining and 
adapting existing administrative practice and jurisprudence to new 
situations is inherent in the application of general rules by administrators 
and judges, and therefore unavoidable. I do not believe however that the 
Appellate Body should increase the likelihood of being obliged to correct 
the reasoning set out in one of its earlier reports. Such corrections would do 
even greater harm to the “security and predictability of the multilateral 
trading system” than the questions that the Appellate Body leaves open 
today in following its rather narrow, case specific approach. In addition, 
such corrections would probably be detrimental to the credibility of the 
Appellate Body and thus affect its legitimacy.
131. The same kind of considerations apply, in my view, to the suggestion that 
the Appellate Body should explain in greater detail how and why it reached 
a certain solution, in discussing more openly the arguments that plead for 
and against the result. I recognise that there are courts that follow a more 
analytical approach in motivating their decisions. However, there are also 
highly regarded courts of last instance that give fewer reasons for their 
decisions. The European Court of Justice is but one of them. Compared 
with these latter jurisdictions, the Appellate Body is surprisingly 
meticulous and transparent. Going further would entail, in my view, the 
same risk as the one described earlier. The Appellate Body might make 
statements that are appropriate in the case in which they are made, but not 
in the context of another case. In other words, the reasoning might contain 
obiter dicta, which risks being too broad and being misunderstood, so that 
it may have to be corrected in the future. The actual “style of motivation” is 
thus a compromise that I consider to be absolutely justified.
57 Article 3.2, first sentence, DSU.





























































































132. During the very first years of its existence, the new dispute settlement 
system has often been called the “crown jewel” of the WTO. I have always 
considered this characterisation with scepticism. It seemed to me to be 
typical for a period of euphoria, a sort of honeymoon, which would not last 
very long. The initial enthusiasm has indeed been replaced by a more sober 
analysis of the situation. Beginning with the controversy generated by the 
amicus curiae rulings, reports of the Appellate Body have increasingly 
been criticised. I have mentioned some of these criticisms, like the protests 
directed against the Appellate Body’s findings with respect to the standard 
of review and the determination of the meaning of national law. Some have 
called the situation created by the amicus curiae conflict an “institutional 
crisis”. In my view, this is as much an overstatement as the earlier 
manifestations of unlimited joy and satisfaction.
133. In conclusion, I would like to repeat what I have said at the beginning of 
this paper: The dispute settlement system negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round seems to me still today an extraordinary achievement that comes 
close to a miracle. It seems to me to be wise not to take its existence for 
granted, and to be guaranteed forever, but to contribute to its consolidation 
and further development in pursuing with circumspection and caution, but 
also with courage and in total independence, the road which has been 
taken, and which has proved so far to be a notable success.
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